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Legal Aspects of Letters of Credit
and Related Secured Transactions
BORIS KOZOLCHYK*
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS A COMMERCIAL LETTER OF CREDIT?
The focus of my presentation will be on the legal aspects of
commercial letters of credit and particularly on some of the difficul-
ties associated with their use across inter-American and international
boundaries.
The first difficulty lies in properly identifying the instrument.
Some lawyers, judges, and legislatures still mistakenly assume that a
commercial or "documentary" letter of credit is the same instrument
as the old or "traveler's" letter of credit. The traveler's letter of
credit, an instrument which was extensively used from the eighteenth
to the early twentieth century, only embodies the liability of the is-
suer, who is not, incidentally, the instrument's paymaster.1 As indi-
cated by its name, the traveler's letter of credit was designed to pro-
vide a traveler with funds in a foreign country. The instrument's
paymaster or payor was usually a foreign nominee who was not liable
on the instrument as he bad neither co-signed it nor accepted the
issuer's order or request of payment. Payment of the travelers' letter
of credit then could not be enforced by its beneficiary-payee against
the payor-nominee, but only against the issuer. If sued as the issuer's
agent, the payor-nominee could validly defend himself by alleging
that the issuer had failed to provide him with funds. The old or
traveler's letter of credit, therefore, could not be an instrument in-
volved in a very significant percentage of international, national, and
local trade transactions.
The instrument required by modern international trade is of rela-
tively recent vintage. It appeared during the second half of the
nineteenth century in European and European-American trade and
came into full use following World War I. It embodies a promise of
* Professor, University of Arizona School of Law; Visiting Professor and Beiley Lecturer in
Residence, Louisiana State University Law Center, Spring 1979; Dr. in Law, 1976,
University of Havana; LL.B., 1959, University of Miami School of Law; LL.M., 1960;
S.J.D., 1966, University of Michigan. Mr. Kozolchyk has written numerous books and
articles dealing with international trade.
1. For a brief description of the seventeenth century letter of credit referred to in the
principal text as the "traveler's" letter of credit, see B. KOZOLCHYK, COM-
MERCIAL LETrERS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS 5-7 (1966) (hereinafter referred to as
Kozolchyk).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
payment by a party of known solvency (usually a bank) either at the
customer's (buyer-importer) or beneficiary's (seller-exporter) place of
business, or in both places. In contrast with the traveler's letter of
credit, an irrevocable-confirmed credit can be enforced against both
the confirming bank in the beneficiary's place of business and the
issuing bank in the customer's location. In addition, the promises of
both the issuing and confirming banks, to use a term dear to civil
lawyers, are "abstract" in nature. This means that, as a rule, they are
independent from and can be enforced regardless of the equities in
the underlying transactions.2 A beneficiary need not worry that the
customer did not pay the issuing bank the latter's commission for the
opening of the credit, or did not provide the requisite collateral or
prepayment. Once he has the irrevocable letter of credit in his pos-
session, he can enforce the issuing or confirming bank's promise by
merely complying with the terms of the operative instrument. Simi-
larly, the issuing and confirming banks are precluded from raising
defenses based upon the underlying transaction between the cus-
tomer and beneficiary, except in extreme cases of fraud or the illegal-
ity of the transaction. 3
Despite these clear differences and the disuse of the old or
seventeenth century letter of credit, many commercial codes, espe-
cially in Latin America, have retained the rules applicable to the old
cartas ordenes de crbdito, and occasionally, lawyers and courts mistak-
enly apply these rules to the modern transaction. For example, one
finds provisions in enactments purporting to deal with the commercial
letter of credit, such as Article 317 of the Mexican negotiable instru-
ments' law, 4 or Article 899 of the Honduran Commercial Code, 5
which expose the beneficiary of a Mexican or Honduran letter of
credit to defenses based on the underlying buyer-seller or customer-
issuing bank relationships. On the whole, however, there is a growing
awareness in the commercial and legal communities of the key fea-
tures of the modern or documentary letter of credit. In large mea-
sure, this awareness has resulted from the virtually universal incorpo-
ration of a set of rules known as the Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits (UCP) in the text of the commercial letter of
2. The subject of abstraction is discussed in greater detail, infra Section IV.
3. Id.
4. Ley General de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito, Diario Oficial de 27 de
Agosto de 1932, arts. 317-20.
5. C6digo de Comercio de Honduras, 16 de Febrero de 1950.
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credit.6 These rules, drafted and periodically revised by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, are not, despite claims to the con-
trary by their draftsmen, 7 a Code, or even a systematic compilation of
the rules that govern commercial letters of credit. They do embody,
however, a consensus among international bankers, and to a lesser
extent, among carriers and insurers as to what should be the basic
principles and guidelines that should govern the handling of letters of
credit and related documents by the banks.
The lack of technical or legal precision of UCP language can
sometimes create unnecessary confusion on some of the key features
of a commercial letter of credit. One such instance is Article 3, Sec-
tion (a) of the 1974 Revision, presently in force.6 Section (a) of Arti-
cle 3 of the UCP defines the irrevocable credit as: "a definite under-
taking of the issuing bank, provided that the terms and conditions of
the credit are complied with." Subsection (a)(3), however, includes
within the scope of the irrevocable promise the issuing bank's obliga-
tion:
to purchase/negotiate, without recourse to drawers and/or bona fide
holders drafts drawn by the beneficiary at sight or at tenor on the
applicant for the credit or any other drawee specified in the credit,
or to provide for the purchase/or negotiation by another bank if the
credit provides for purchase/negotiation.
The first question prompted by this language is what is the obliga-
tional meaning of one bank's "providing" for another bank's purchase
or negotiation? What is the beneficiary's remedy if the second bank
refuses to purchase or negotiate? Secondly, since Article 3(a)(3) does
not indicate what kind of purchase or negotiation it will be, i.e., with
or without recourse on the drawer-beneficiary, can the second bank
validly refuse to negotiate except with recourse on the beneficiary?
The absence of such an indication is all the more noticeable by com-
paring the text of subsection 3 in sections (a) and (b). Subsection (b)(3)
clearly provides that a confirming bank's purchase or negotiation of
beneficiary's draft is without recourse in all instances in which
6. UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDIT (hereinafter
referred to as UCP), International Chamber of Commerce, Publication 290, contain-
ing the 1974 revision presently in force.
7. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce Brochure 222 at 3, referring
to the 1933 customs as a "codification". See also F. EISEMANN, LE CR ItIT
DOCUMENTAIRE 75 (1963), referring to the International Chamber of Commerce as a
work of "codification".
8. UCP, supra note 7.
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purchase or negotiation is provided. Subsection (a)(3) expressly provides
that the purchase/negotiation of drafts drawn on the applicant for the
credit, or on any other drawee specified in the credit, is on a non-
recourse basis, whereas with respect to the purchase/negotiation by
"another bank," there simply is no indication whether the issuing
bank will be responsible for it being on a nonrecourse basis. Conceiv-
ably, therefore, a credit could still be defined as irrevocable if it con-
tained the issuing bank's promise that another bank acting as a pur-
chasing or negotiating bank will purchase or negotiate a beneficiary's
draft with recourse on the beneficiary. Such a credit, however, is
only irrevocable in appearance and would definitely not be in a
client's best interest, especially if the negotiating bank seeks recourse
for a reason such as its failure to obtain reimbursement or prepay-
ment from the issuing bank.
In answering the question of what is a commercial letter of
credit, then, one should bear in mind not only the distinction be-
tween the old and the new letter of credit; it is also important to
remember that what characterizes the "new" irrevocable letter of
credit is the undisputed enforceability of its promise of payment
(whether immediately or "at sight" or in time) upon the beneficiary's
compliance with terms stated in the operative credit instrument. Ac-
cordingly, any subjection of such a promise to defenses arising from
the underlying transactions between buyer and seller, or between the
buyer and the issuing bank, or between the issuing or confirming
bank is inconsistent with the nature of the instrument.
II. SOURCES OF LETTER OF CREDIT LAW
In keeping with my purpose of focusing on areas where the di-
versity of law can lead to operational difficulties, I will now turn to
the question of what are the main sources of letter of credit law.
Only a small number of jurisdictions have enacted statutory law
specifically applicable to commercial letters of credit. The Foreign
Trade Code of Czechoslovakia, the Commercial Codes of Colombia,
Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Lebanon, Syria, and the United States,
statutory rules in diverse commercial law enactments in the German
Democratic Republic, Greece, and Mexico are the only statutory or
quasi-statutory rules I found in a recently concluded survey for the
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law. 9 Courts in most
9. Czechoslovakian International Trade Code, Act. No. 101 of Dec. 4, 1963;
Colombian Commercial Code, arts. 1408-15 (1971); Guatemalan Commercial Code,
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jurisdictions, therefore, rely on the Uniform Customs and Practice as
either the law expressly chosen by the parties, or as the formal cus-
tomary law applicable even if the parties, or, more accurately, the
issuing or confirming banks, did not choose its application. Since such
an exclusion is highly unlikely, as banks (almost invariably) incorpo-
rate the UCP as part of the letter of credit and use standardized
credit forms drawn by the same International Chamber of Commerce
with boiler plate which incorporates the UCP, the influence of the
UCP in judicial decisionmaking throughout the world is paramount.
Writers, particularly in civil law jurisdictions, question whether
certain UCP rules, such as those on timely compliance with the terms
of the credit or on presentation of documents, should exclude
explicit, although much broader civil code provisions, such as those
on timely performance. 10 In addition, courts both in common law
and civil law jurisdictions have refused to apply the UCP's broadly
gauged disclaimers of bank liability" where they come into conflict
with the forum's "imperative" or "public policy" provisions. On the
whole, however, and excepting instances of collision with the forum's
public policy, most courts tend to regard the UCP as a fully fledged
or "formal" commercial custom and not merely as a "contractual us-
age." Such a status makes it unnecessary to incorporate the UCP ex-
pressly into the operative instrument or instruments. Except in cases
of unconscionability or of "abuses of rights," it does not require proof
arts. 758-65 (1970); Honduran Commercial Code, supra note 6, arts. 898-910;
Lebanese Commercial Code, art. 313 (1942); Syrian Commercial Code, art. 418
(1949); German Democratic Republic, Law on International Economic Contracts of
Feb. 5, 1970 (GBI, I, 61) Part 8, ch. 6; Greek Decree Law of July 17, Aug. 13, 1923
(Kd. Them. 582-92) arts. 24-34; Mexican LTOC, supra note 5. For a discussion of
these sources, see Kozolchyk, Letters of Credit, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF LEGAL SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAwV paras.
16-20 (to be published in 1979) (hereinafter referred to as Kozolchyk Encyclopedia).
10. See, e.g., LABANCA, NOACCO, AND VERA BARRos, EL CRU DITO DOCUMENT-
ADO 189-90, suggesting that Argentine courts should apply Argentine Civil Code art.
24 on the determination of time-lines of documentary compliance rather than the
UCP.
11. Referring to the disclaimer of bank liability still present in art. 9 of the UCP,
Shattuck and Guernsey, Letters of Credit and the UCC, 37 WASH. L. REv. 325, 357
n.63 (1962), conclude that: "The distaste of U.S. Courts for broad gauge exculpatory
clause[s] suggest that an attempt to incorporate such a clause by reference may not
work unless the beneficiary can be shown to have actual knowledge of the provision
of UCP." Argentine and Brazilian courts have rejected UCP provisions which tended
to operate as broad disclaimers of the banks' liability for faulty verification of docu-
ments. See, e.g., the decision by the Argentine Camara Nacional de Apelaci6n Com-
ercial, Cap. Fed. Oct. 2, 1950, JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 1952 II, 233; and the
Brazilian, Ap. Civ. Sao Paulo, Oct. 27, 1950, Rev. Trib. Sao Paulo 190 (1951).
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of the parties' awareness of the meaning of the UCP. On the other
hand, this status does not preclude the parties' express exclusion of
the UCP as a governing source.' 2  In the United States, the UCP's
interaction with the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has given rise
to some interesting "source of law" decisions. It is clear that where
there is an inconsistency between UCC and UCP provisions, such as
on the presumption of revocability or irrevocability, when letters of
credit are silent on the point, the court will rightfully (except in a
jurisdiction such as New York where the UCP has by statute preemi-
nent application) apply the UCC rule.' 3 It is also clear that
whenever possible, courts in the United States will avoid reading the
UCP and UCC provisions in a conflictive light. Whenever possible,
the UCP rule will be applied in a manner complementary to the
UCC, and in the absence of a UCC rule, the UCP will be allowed to
fill the gap as a binding local banking custom or usage of trade.
1 4
There are sound conceptual reasons for such a harmonious view
of the UCC-UCP interaction. The UCC is, by far, the legislative
enactment that most closely reflects contemporary letter of credit
practices. In addition, Article 5 of the UCC is, on the whole, a well-
crafted enactment. It combines technical or purely legal concepts,
such as those underlying the remedies for the various types of
breach, with "living law" rules derived from widely followed banking
practices.
The contrast between the UCC and other legislative enactments
is apparent at first sight. For example, not only does an enactment
such as the Mexican LTOC espouse a principle which is totally incon-
sistent with the nature of the modern letter of credit,' 5 but even its
basic terminology is mistaken and confusing. The Mexican LTOC
12. Maurice Megrah, the highly respected British practitioner and scholar makes
the point clearly in H.C. GuTrEt1DGE and M. MEGRAH, THE LAw OF BANKERS'
COMMERCIAL CREDITS 7 (1976).
13. See, e.g., West Virginia Housing Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107 (W.
D. Pa. 1976), where a credit silent as to its revocability was, contrary to the 1974
UCP Art. 1, deemed irrevocable. It should be noted that the credit transcribed in
the report contained no reference to the UCP, and consequently, the Court's applica-
tion of UCC Art. 5 and of "normal principles governing interpretation of contracts"
was not the product of a choice between two contradictory provisions.
14. See, e.g., AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All Am. Sports Club,
Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222 (D. Ariz. 1978), where the UCP was applied as local banking
custom, although the court suggested that it might consider proof of the local banking
usage contrary to that incorporated in the UCP if such proof was tendered.
15. See notes 5 and 6, supra and accompanying text.
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labels the irrevocable letter a "confirmed" credit, regardless of
whether it was truly confirmed. Such a terminology can only lead to
the conclusion that an irrevocable unconfirmed letter of credit is
likely to be treated as irrevocable-confirmed by the LTOC. Mutatis
mutandis, Article 1414 of the Colombian Commercial Code provides,
in a manner equally inconsistent with the nature of the confirmation,
that the confirming bank will be liable "on the same terms" (en los
mismos tdrminos) as the issuing bank. Thus, it is in direct contradic-
tion with both the 1974 UCP Article 3(b) which describes the con-
firming bank's liability as one "in addition to the undertaking of the
issuing bank" and with UCC § 5-107 (2) which describes the confirm-
ing bank's liability as dependent upon "the extent of its confirma-
tion."
I would be unjust to my own trade if, in concluding this section,
I would not call attention to the significant influence that doctrinal
writing has had in shaping letter of credit law in important trading
centers. Books such as Gutteridge and Megrah's, The Law of Bank-
ers' Commercial Credits, Ward and Harfield's, Banks Credits and Ac-
ceptances, and more recently Henry Harfield's fifth edition of the
same book, have been quite influential in Anglo-American and even
in some civil law jurisdictions. Similarly, J. Stoufflet's Le Crbdit
Documentaire, J. Zahn's, Zahlung and Zahlunggssicherung im Au-
senhandel, C. E. Balossini's, Norme Ed Usi Uniformi Relativi Ai
Crediti Docuentari, Labanca, Noacco y Vera Barros, El Cridito
Documentado, have shaped French, German, Italian, and Argentine
law, respectively. The reason why doctrinal writing is so uniformly
influential in this area of the law is twofold: first, judges frequently
need a "legal" explanation of banking and commercial practices; sec-
ond, the merchants' inability to formulate sound or generally appli-
cable law requires that many of the "banking" customs be formulated
by "outsiders," such as doctrinal writers.16
16. The problem alluded to in the principal text is not only that of a technically
deficient text of customary rules, but of one-sided rules, or rules which treat regular
participants in the transaction, such as banks, in a highly favorable or "brotherly"
manner and treat occasional participants, such as an importer, exporter, or consumer,
in an unfavorable or "stranger" like fashion. I have discussed these standards and
their role in commercial law making in a recent article; Kozolchyk, Fairness in Anglo
and Latin American Commercial Adjudication, 2 B.C. INTL. & COMP. L. REv. 219
(1979); and also in the 1979 Tucker Lecture at the Louisiana Law Center, to be
published in the Fall 1979 issue of the Louisiana Law Review.
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III. THE ISSUING BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
A. Contract or Quasi-Contract
The important comparative law datum in this, the first chronolog-
ical relationship in the letter of credit transaction, is its diverse
characterization in U.S., European, and Latin American banking law.
From a United States standpoint, unless the bank specifically com-
mits itself to issuing a letter of credit and charges a commitment fee,
or otherwise complies with the contractual consideration require-
ment, it is not bound to issue the letter of credit. The customer's
application for the issuance of a credit, despite the occasional label as
"application-agreement," and despite the occasional stamp or signa-
ture of acceptance by the bank, is only an application and not an
agreement. It is not a bilateral contract binding on the bank.
Experienced U.S. bankers will quickly explain that there are
good reasons for such an indefinite state of affairs at this early stage of
the letter of credit transaction. Experience has shown both United
States and British bankers that in many credits the beneficiary's sol-
vency and reliability are as important as the customer's. Frequently,
just before issuance, some information indicating the probable inability
to obtain reimbursement from the customer or valuable collateral
from the beneficiary may come to the issuing bank's attention. Con-
sequently, he tries to be as "flexible" in his promise or undertaking to
the customer as possible. In this sense, the relationship between the
customer and the issuing bank is quasi-contractual, or one where lia-
bility is triggered by the actual rendering of the bank's service of
issuance, or the payment of the credit.
By contrast, many civil law jurisdictions, especially in Latin
America, characterize the issuing bank-customer relationship as con-
tractual and binding on the issuing bank from the moment of execu-
tion of the contract of "opening of credit."
This contract, frequently depicted as onerous, bilateral, and synal-
lagmatic provides a cause of action for the customer who, having ful-
filled or standing ready to fulfill his side of the bargain, is neverthe-
less met by the issuing bank's refusal to issue a credit. To be sure,
the opening of a credit agreement usually stipulates that if a condition
subsequent supervenes, such as the customer's or beneficiary's insol-
vency, the contract can be rescinded by the bank without incurring
liability. The presence of such a condition subsequent should not
prompt the conclusion that the difference between the United States
and the Latin American approach is purely nominal. A U.S. bank
LETTERS OF CREDIT
may well decide for causes other than those in the condition sub-
sequent of the opening of credit agreement, not to go ahead with the
issuance, and would be protected in doing so by the quasi-contractual
approach. Accordingly, an American customer who must be able to
count on the bank's issuance should avail himself of the bank's com-
mitment mechanism. A firm commitment is usually obtained from the
bank upon the customer's payment of a commitment fee.
B. Issuing Bank's Security
An Anglo-American issuing bank can resort to several informal
and flexible transactions when attempting to secure its customer's
payment or reimbursement of the issuance. Prior to the issuance, the
issuing bank usually obtains a security agreement from the customer.
This agreement, occasionally referred to as a "letter of hypothecation"
by British banks, conveys through the seller a security interest on the
documents of title, merchandise, and proceeds of the sale thereof to
the issuing bank. This conveyance takes place at a time prior to the
bank's possession of any of the above described collateral. In some
instances, it is supplemented by a "blocked account" stipulation,
whereby the customer's funds on deposit in his account with the issu-
ing bank are set aside, segregated, or earmarked for the purpose of
payment of the issuance. Alternatively, or in addition to the blocked
account, a customer may be required to deposit valuable and liquid
or highly marketable collateral with the bank. Formalities are mini-
mal in these agreements, and the security interest in the documents
of title, merchandise, and proceeds is "perfected" during a period of
twenty-one (21) days in accordance with UCC Article 9 without hav-
ing to file the customary financing statement.' 7 If the customer can-
not repay the bank upon the arrival of the goods, the bank can re-
lease the documents of title to the customer upon the latter's signing
a "trust receipt." The trust receipt empowers the customer to store,
warehouse, work upon, or even sell the goods, but impresses the pro-
ceeds of such a sale with the bank's ubiquitous security interest.18 As
with the initial security agreement, the trust receipt security interest
17. UCC § 9-304(4) (1978 Official Text) provides for temporary perfection of the
bank's security interest, without filing or possession, for twenty-one days from the
time the interest attaches (execution of the security agreement or letter of hypotheca-
tion) to the extent that it arises for new value given by the issuing bank in connection
with the security agreement.
18. For a discussion of the trust receipt in connection with the letter of credit
transaction, see Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 155-89.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
can be temporarily perfected (during twenty-one days) without the
filing of the agreement or financing statement.19 I hasten to add for
the benefit of my civil law readers that despite its name, the trust
receipt is not a legitimate heir of the common law real property trust.
The trustee's legal title is not derived from the bank-entruster but
from the seller-beneficiary of the letter of credit transaction. In ad-
dition, the bank is both an entruster and beneficiary in the trust re-
ceipt transaction. The nature of the trust receipt, therefore, is that of
a personal property secured transaction much as is a chattel mortgage
or a condition sale. Indeed, the trust receipt was designed to over-
come some of the problems posed by these personal property secured
transactions when used in conjunction with letters of credit. Thus, a
trust receipt that had not been recorded could still be deemed per-
fected, albeit for a limited period of time, without suffering invalida-
tion as a "secret lien". 20  In addition, through the "tracing"
mechanism, the trust receipt affects successive generations of pro-
ceeds, such as negotiable instruments obtained in payment of mer-
chandise, cash in payment of negotiable instruments, and merchan-
dise acquired with such cash or negotiable instruments.
2 1
In contrast, secured transactions in civil, and especially Latin
American, law jurisdictions require greater formality and provide less
security to the issuing bank. For example, in El Salvador, the crea-
tion of the bank's security interest on the documents of title and mer-
chandise requires the execution of a contract of "opening of documen-
tary credit". 22  In even sharper contrast with prevailing views in
Anglo-American jurisdictions, a Chilean banking law authority
suggests the need for formal pledge agreements to precede or accom-
pany the beneficiary's endorsement or delivery of documents of title
to the bank in order to perfect the latter's security interest.23  In
addition to the constraints imposed by greater formality at the crea-
tion stage, the bank's right at the time of realization of the security
19. See UCC § 9-304(5) (a) and (b) (1978 Official Text).
20. Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 158-62.
21. See UCC § 9-306 (1978 Official Text).
22. Art. 1125 of the Commercial Code of El Salvador predicates the issuing
bank's obligation to the customer on the delivery of documents which will serve as
the issuing bank's collateral, per the contract of opening of credit.
23. See J.C. VARELA MORGAN, EL ACREDITIVO 87 (1960). According to this au-
thor, Art. 815 of the Chilean Commercial Code of 1865 provides that the pledge's
preference over other secured and unsecured claims requires a public deed or a
private but notarized writing. He concludes that since banks do not adhere to such
formalities they are not truly protected by the pledge type of security.
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interest in many Latin American jurisdictions are similiarly curtailed.
Since Latin American lawyers, as a rule, adhere to the notion that
ownership or ownership-like rights can only be created by a limited
number of juristic acts or transactions, such as adverse possession,
inheritance, or contract of sale, and since secured transactions are not
among these, the bank, as a secured creditor, cannot act as an owner
with respect to the collateral. This restriction impedes the bank's
power of disposition over the merchandise as holder of the documents
of title or even as the party in rightful possession of the merchandise.
A stipulation allowing the banks such power of disposition upon the
customer's default is usually tagged with the ominous sounding label
of Pactum Commissorium and is held to be illegal. 24  Thus, a provi-
sion such as Article 111 of Mexico's General Law of Banking Institu-
tions, which authorizes the bank's private sale of the merchandise
upon its own (as contrasted with a judicial) determination of default,
is still an exceptional provision in Latin American jurisdictions. 25 The
informal, broad, and flexible powers granted to the issuing bank as a
secured creditor by the West German "General Terms and Condi-
tions of Banking" 26 are still foreign to banking law and practice in the
majority of Latin American jurisdictions.
24. On the Pactum Commissorium's relation to the issuing bank's security, see
Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 126 n.14, 137.
25. For a comment on Art. 111 of the Mexican Ley General de Instituciones de
Cr~dito y Organizaciones Auxiliares, Diario Oficial Mayo 31, 1941, see Kozolchyk,
supra note 1, at 128-29. For a comment on the Argentine Commercial Code's Art.
585, a similarly exceptional provision, see id. at 125-27.
26. See, e.g., Allgemeine Geschaftsbedingungen (General Business Conditions of
German Banks, English translation supplied by Dresdner Bank) April 1977 version
which, in relevant sections provide:
19. (1) The bank is entitled at any time to request its customer to provide
or increase security according to banking practice for all liabilities, even if
they are conditional or unmatured. (2) Any things and rights, including
claims of the customer against the bank, which have in any way come or
may come into the possession of any office of the bank or of which it may
be able to dispose, shall serve as pledge for all existing and future
claims-including conditional or unmatured claims-of the bank against
the customer. Such pledge shall also apply to claims against the customer,
which may pass to the bank from third parties and to claims of the bank
against firms for whose obligations the customer is personally liable. It
makes no difference whether the bank has obtained direct or indirect pos-
session, or actual or legal power to dispose of such things and rights. 20.
(1) If the customer fails to meet his obligations at maturity, the bank shall
be entitled to realize such security without legal proceedings at any time
at any place which it may deem appropriate, either at once or from time
to time, while making allowance for the interests of the customer as far as
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With the exception of Brazil's Law No. 4.728 of 1965, which au-
thorized the use of trust receipts (alienagao fiduciaria en garantia),
2 7
most civil law jurisdictions lack a statutory basis for the enforcement
of the bank's rights as a trustee upon the release of the documents of
title to its customer. Mistakenly, the vast majority of writers in civil
law jurisdictions equate the absence of an express statutory approval
of trust receipt-like transactions with a systemic disability to use an
equivalent device. This is in large measure the result of assuming that
the trust receipt security interest is predicated on the ability to frag-
ment title into legal and equitable components, as in the common law
trust. The fallacy of such a view is apparent by examining the opera-
tion of Germany's Sicherungsubereignung, a security device which is
the trust receipt's functional counterpart and which does not require
or presuppose a fragmentation of the ownership of documents of title,
merchandise, and proceeds thereof.
28
IV. THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE ISSUING OR CONFIRMING BANK-
BENEFICIARY RELATIONSHIP
Although the relationship between the issuing and confirming
banks and the beneficiary is commonly referred to as "contractual,"
possible. Where there is more than one security, the bank may choose
between them. It may first seek to obtain satisfaction from other assets of
the customer. The bank will provide the customer with a credit advice
concerning the proceeds, such advice being admitted as invoice for the
delivery of goods serving as security and meeting the requirements of the
turnover tax law (Umsatzsteuerrecht). (2) No notice of realization need be
given, nor need any time limit be observed, nor need the purchase price
be immediately payable in cash. No deviation from the regular method of
sale of pledged security can be demanded by the customer. The bank will
as far as possible give notice of the method, place and time of realization,
provided such a notice is not considered inappropriate.
27. See Lei No. 4, 728 de 14 de julio de 1965, Mercado de Capitais, Art. 66.
28. J. ZAHN, ZAHLUNG UND ZAHLUNCSSICHERUNG IM AUSENHANDEL 177 (5th
ed.) describes the Sicherungsubereignung as follows:
As in German law a valid pledge requires continued possession of the
goods so that their delivery to the pledgor destroys the pledge . . . the
security will have to be furnished by way of a security transfer of owner-
ship .... In order to preserve the continuity of its security, the bank
must ensure that the ownership in the documents and therefore-where
negotiable documents of title are issued-also the property of the goods is
transferred directly from the beneficiary to the bank, without first passing
to the buyer. [Translation supplied by the staff of the Max Planck Institute
for Private International and Comparative Law, Hamburg.]
For a full discussion of the possibility of adapting the trust receipt mechanism in civil
Law jurisdictions see Kozolchyk Encyclopedia, supra note 9, at paras. 121-25.
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there is no contract, in the strict sense of the term, between the
beneficiary and the banks. It is even less possible to rely on contract
law concepts such as mutuality of promises or consideration to explain
the nature of the bank's liability to the beneficiary. The beneficiary
neither pays nor promises anything to the banks in return for their
promises of payment. He is not bound to "use" the credit and, where
banks are concerned, he can safely ignore their issuance of confirma-
tion. Moreover, the banks' irrevocable promise to the beneficiary is
valid and binding regardless of whether there was consideration for it,
or whether consideration could be connected in some manner with
the beneficiary or with his actual or imputed agent.
The issuing and confirming banks' promises to the beneficiary of
an irrevocable letter of credit is a formal and abstract promise of
payment. It is formal in the sense that it must be in writing and must
contain certain customary expressions such as "we engage" or "we
promise" or "undertake." In addition, some terms are essential, such
as a maximum amount, a period of expiry, and a credit number.
2 9 It
is abstract in the sense that it is independent of underlying equities
between the parties. For example, there may be a genuine failure of
consideration between the buyer and the seller as a result of the lat-
ter's shipment of defective merchandise; the buyer may have failed to
provide the issuing banks with funds for the issuance of the credit, or
the issuing bank may have failed to provide funds to the confirming
bank. Yet, both the issuing and confirming bank are bound to pay the
credit upon beneficiary's compliance with its terms.
The concept of an abstract promise or obligation, incidentally, is
not peculiar to letter of credit or even to negotiable instruments' law.
Its function is to encourage third parties' reliance on certain legally
29. The subject of the formalities of the letter of credit is covered extensively in
Kozolchyk Encyclopedia, paras. 170-181. A useful, although incomplete, listing may
be found in Comptroller of the Currency Interpretive Ruling 60,906 of May 9, 1977,
FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 38,887:
As a matter of sound banking practice, letters of credit should be issued in
conformity with the following: a) each letter of credit should conspicuously
state that it is a letter of credit or should be conspicuously entitled as
such; b) the bank's undertaking should contain a specified expiration date
or be for a definite term; c) the bank's obligation to pay should arise only
upon presentation of a draft or other documents specified in the letter of
credit, and the bank must not be called upon to determine questions of
fact or law at issue between the account party and the beneficiary; d) the
bank's customer should have an unqualified obligation to reimburse the
bank for payments made under the letter of credit. (As amended effective
May 12, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 24206 (1977)).
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sanctioned "appearances," whether such an "appearance" is a formal
private party promise or an official or governmental certificate. In
fact, abstraction is pervasive in the law of property where it is used to
protect the purchaser of personal and real property from infirmities in
his chain of title, especially when he relies on a sanctioned appear-
ance of title, such as the grantor's possession or a recording in his
name. In this respect, the promise of the issuing and confirming bank
has a great deal in common with a certificate of ownership issued by a
land registrar in jurisdictions where such a certificate assures an un-
disturbed enjoyment of title.
The principle of abstraction, which the UCP enunciates prover-
bially as "banks are concerned with documents and not with
goods," 30 requires that the banks examine the documents in a simi-
larly abstract fashion. The banks must ascertain that the documents
submitted by the beneficiary on their face comply with the terms of
the credit, and unless required by the terms of the issuance, they
should refrain from determining the veracity or accuracy of what is
stated in the documents. 3 1 The standard for judging compliance is
strict. In fact, the judicial principle that governs the bank's examina-
tion of documents is referred to as one of "strict compliance." As
stated in 1927 by Lord Sumner in Equitable Trust Co. of New York
v. Dawson Partners, "there is no room for documents which are al-
most the same, or which will do just as well." 
3 2
The perennial question that both experienced bankers and judges
must ask themselves, however, is how strict must strict compliance
be? If the invoice is required to describe the merchandise as "hydro-
gen peroxide," is it defective if it is described instead as H202?
Moreover, in light of the stated requirement of inter-documentary
consistency, 33 should the bank reject a bill of lading that, in contrast
with the invoice which describes the shipped statue as the "Venus of
Milo," describes it as "a badly damaged statue?" 34 Please note that in
30. See 1974 UCP Art. 8 (a): "In documentary credit operations all parties con-
cerned deal in documents and not in goods"; see also General Provision: "Credits, by
their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other contracts on which they
may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such contracts."
31. 1974 UCP Art. 7.
32. (19271 27 Lloyd's List L.R. 42.
33. 1974 UCP Art. 7 states: "Documents which appear on their face to be incon-
sistent with one another will be considered as not appearing on their face to be in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit."
34. Letter of credit students owe this excellent example to Professor John Hon-
nold; see Honnold, Letters of Credit, Custom, Missing Documents and the Dixon
Case, 53 COLUM. L. Rlv. 504, 507 (1953).
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the first of the preceding illustrations the discrepancy is nonexistent,
as the terms have exactly the same meaning. Also, note that in the
second illustration, the discrepancy results not from a factual differ-
ence, as the shipped object is the same, but from the different nature
of the respective documents. The invoice reflects the seller's descrip-
tion of the merchandise, and as the old Spanish saying goes, "the
master's eye fattens the cow," whereas the bill of lading reflects the
carrier's concern not to be responsible for damages suffered by the
merchandise while under his care. Accordingly, even though their
descriptions differ, they are not necessarily inconsistent. In addition,
certain discrepancies may be cured by custom-inspired devices, such
as letters of indemnity,3 5 while others, such as in the hydrogen
peroxide illustration, are truly insignificant.
Despite the insignificance of these deviations, customers have a
known propensity to insist that they are indeed significant whenever
the price of the merchandise suffers a drastic drop, or other cir-
cumstances indicate that they are likely to suffer a severe loss if re-
quired to pay for the amount of the credit. Courts in developed trad-
ing centers are generally aware of such a propensity, and consequently,
tend to take the issuing banks' objections to beneficiary's compliance
more seriously when raised by the issuing bank than those of the
customers when raised against the issuing or confirming banks' accep-
tance or payment.
3 6
Conversely, however, a beneficiary may decide to take advantage
of the abstraction of the letter of credit promise and of the principle
of strict compliance by submitting documents that on their face com-
ply with the terms of the credit, but which in fact are forged or
fraudulent. The judicial question then becomes whether to adopt a
formalistic attitude and disregard the substance of the transaction,
tainted as it is with fraud, or to grant an equitable remedy, such as an
injunction against beneficiary's presentation of documents and draw-
ing on the credit, or against acceptance or payment, by the issuing or
confirming bank.
Letter of credit law is presently suffering what Henry Harfield,
one of the United States' most distinguished banking lawyers, with
characteristic poignancy has described as an injunction epidemic. In
significant measure, this is the result of the increased use of the so-
called "standby credits." These credits are not used to pay for title-
35. See Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 432-43.
36. Id. at 264-66.
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passing transactions, but to assure beneficiaries compensation in the
event the customer does not perform according to the agreed-upon
terms in the underlying transaction. Frequently, the beneficiary can
obtain payments of huge sums by merely stating or certifying that he
is entitled to them.
It is true that in the standby credit, as in other types of commer-
cial letters of credit, the bank does not concern itself with the under-
lying performance, but with the documents which refer to it, and that
its function is to ascertain that the documents, and solely the docu-
ments, comply with the terms of the credit. In this sense, it is correct
to draw the line between having to ascertain the occurrence of an
event or the existence of a fact which is, in principle, foreign to the
bank's function, and the documentary representation that the event
has happened, which is the bank's role to verify. Nevertheless, the
line between verifying reality and its representation is not as neat as
one would like it to be.
Assume, for example, that government A has requested from
weapons supplier B, a private party in country C, to supply a standby
credit to compensate government A for B's breach or improper per-
formance, so that if the weapons are unsatisfactory, A would be com-
pensated for damages. The standby credit would be paid then merely
upon A's presentation to the issuing or confirming bank of a certifi-
cate indicating that B had failed to carry out his obligation under the
weapons supply agreements.
37
Assume further that as a result of A's war with a neighboring
country, C decided to embargo arms shipments to A. A presented a
certification that B had failed to carry out its obligations, even though
B had not breached its sales warranties and was ready to ship the
ordered weapons as per A's order once C's embargo was lifted. Is A's
representation of contractual default merely a representation, or is it
a fraudulent distortion of fact, especially since the words used to rep-
resent the occurrence of the event triggering payment were totally
out of contractual context? Should the issuing bank, although aware of
the different context in which words were to be used in the certifica-
tion, simply ignore the distortion?
Let me illustrate the role of the context of the words in a certifi-
cation further by providing the following not very unlikely hypothetical
37. The factual situation described in the text is based upon the description of
facts in Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 356
F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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situation. Assume that an Iranian importer of French liquor ob-
tained a standby credit payable upon his or his successor in interest's
certification of "undrinkability." Assume further that his successor in
interest happens to be the present revolutionary government, and
that as part of an exalting and purifying religious exercise, the liquor
in question, without ever being tasted, is publicly disposed of in the
most dramatic of fashions, including gestures of condemnation, in the
presence of Western world television cameras. Should a bank which
is aware of such an exercise pay the standby credit upon the Iranian
government's certification of "undrinkability?"
As in many other instances, the extraordinary commercial law
intuition of Justice Cardozo pointed to the absurdity and injustice of
accepting a fraudulent or context-distorting document as the docu-
ment required by the credit. As Justice Cardozo inquired in his dis-
sent in O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank38: Can the tender of
false documents be regarded as in compliance? Moreover, should the
principle of abstraction, designed as it is to protect third parties who
act in good faith, be invoked by a beneficiary who does not act in
good faith? Are there not valid grounds for distinguishing between
the third party status of a beneficiary who submits fraudulent docu-
ments, and that of a bona fide purchaser of his draft which grants the
protection of abstraction to the latter but not the former? This was
another question implicit in Justice Cardozo's O'Meara dissent. It was
responded to in the affirmative in the landmark decision on letter of
credit injunctions, Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corpora-
tion." The Sztejn Court adopted Cardozo's view that when the is-
suer of the letter of credit knows that a document, though correct in
form, is in fact false or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognize
such a document as complying with the terms of the credit. The
Court warned, however, that if it appeared that the bank presenting
the documents and draft for payment was a holder in due course, its
claim could not be defeated, even though the primary transaction was
tainted with fraud. Thus, the Sztejn Court recognized with Justice
Cardozo that equity, as has been the case through the history of the
law merchant, was no stranger to the law of letter of credit transac-
tions.
In the ensuing decades since the Sztejn decision, courts in the
United States and Great Britain have clarified and broadened several
38. 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925).
39. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631 (1941).
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important injunction-related issues. Among these are the scope and
role of temporary restraining orders, the time within which a tempo-
rary restraining order or a preliminary injunction must be sought, the
seriousness of beneficiary's alleged fraud, and the issuing bank's rights
and duties when notified of actionable fraud.
40
By contrast, most continental European and Latin American
courts are much more restricted in their use of injunctive relief. A
procedural device which serves as a counterpart of the Anglo-
American injunction in letter of credit litigation is the Belgian and
French Saisie Arrt and the Italian Sequestro Guidizario.4 1 Yet,
since these are essentially attachment procedures, the petitioner-
customer not only has to allege fraud (an allegation whose elements
are far from being clear in continental European and letter of credit
law), but he must also prove that he has a valid claim, or the basis of a
valid claim as to the amount of money sought to be attached or
sequestered.
This poses a vexing problem of legal logic, for the greater the
likelihood of beneficiary's fraud, pari passu the customer's claim upon
the funds in the bank's possession. In other words, the petitioner, as
a saisie arrt or sequestro guidizario, must show that he has a valid
claim to funds in deposit with a stakeholder, which in our case is the
issuing or confirming bank. But the letter of credit funds are only
claimable or only susceptible to appropriation by the beneficiary or
his creditors when the creditor-petitioner can prove that the ben-
eficiary himself has a valid claim to the funds in deposit with the
bank. Yet, this assumption is contradicted by the customer's own al-
legation of beneficiary's fraud. If the beneficiary has no valid claim to
the funds in deposit with the bank because of his own fraud, how can
the customer who is trying to attach the proceeds of beneficiary's
claim succeed in his attachment?
40. On the scope and role of the temporary restraining order in English letter of
credit law, see Hanzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Industries, Ltd., [1958] 2 Q.B.
127 (C.A.). On the timeliness of an injunction procedure see Tranarg, C.A. v. Banca
Commerciale Italianal, 90 Misc. 2d 829, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (1977). On the elements
of the allegation of fraud see Dynamic Corp., supra note 37, and compare West
Virginia Housing Dev. Fund, supra note 13. On the effect of notice of fraud to the
bank, see Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 250 N.W.2d 172 (Minn. 1977). For
a discussion of these and other decisions clarifying the various elements of an injunc-
tion procedure, see Kozolchyk Encyclopedia, paras. 217-32.
41. For a comparison of the Belgian, French, and German procedural devices
with the Anglo-American injunction see Kozolchyk Encyclopedia, supra note 9, at
paras. 227-32.
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In addition to these logical problems, the saisie arrt and the
sequestro presuppose that the issuing bank has set aside or will set
aside funds for the payment of the credit, and that such payment will
be impeded by the attachment of such funds. Thus, it may be ineffec-
tive against the act of acceptance of beneficiary's draft, which post-
pones the payment of funds until the date of the draft's maturity, and
it may also be ineffective against the claim of the holder of the accept-
ance if he is someone other than the beneficiary himself. Presum-
ably, the customer would have neither a valid claim nor the basis of a
valid claim against such a third party.
The Anglo-American injunction, then, is a much more flexible
and efficient device for the prevention of beneficiary's fraud and for
the corrections of excesses of abstractions and strict compliance than
is the saisie arrt and the sequestro guidizario. Unlike other students
of letters of credit law, I am not terribly disturbed by its availability.
I am aware of the point of view that the injunctive relief can render
the irrevocable letter of credit promise highly uncertain, but I do not
share it. On the contrary, a comparative law examination of commer-
cial law-making in developed and underdeveloped market economies
leads me to conclude that certainty and predictability in commercial
lawmaking is in large measure the result of tailoring official or "posi-
tive" law to the sense of fairness of the participants in market transac-
tions. 42 I have found that the most widespread standard of fairness
in commercial law adjudication in developed market economies is one
in which the prevailing rules of law are those which echo the manner
in which most market participants treat each other when viewing
their own advantage.
Clearly, such a standard is incompatible with a rule which re-
quires that banks, even though aware of a fraud or forgery, ought
nevertheless to pay the person perpetrating it. Such a rule could only
be justified if the ordinary participants in the letter of credit transac-
tion were willing to reward the swindlers among them. Even if
it is true that standby credits (which as indicated earlier are the most
susceptible to allegations of fraud) may not be as freely requested or
issued, this may not be such an undesirable development. The
42. Kozolchyk, Toward a Theory of Law in Economic Development: The Costa
Rican USAID-ROCAP Law Reform Project, 1971 LAw & Soc. ORDER 681, 710-3;
see also Kozolchyk, Commercial Law Recodification and Economic Development in
Latin America, 4 LAw. AM. 189, 192 (1972); Kozolchyk, Fairness in Anglo-American
and Latin American Commercial Adjudication, 2 B.C. INTL. & Comp. L. REv. 219
(1979).
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parties' hesitation to obtain the issuance of a standby credit because
the beneficiary's representation may possibly be scrutinized by a court
could well prevent the issuance of standbys where the parties had
never truly agreed on what constituted proper performance of the
underlying transaction. Thus, in addition to preventing the perpetra-
tion of fraud, it would force the parties' lawyers to employ their best
drafting skills.
